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Farmer v. Brennan: 
PRISON OFFICIALS 
MAY BE HELD 
LIABLE UNDER 
THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT FOR 
"DELIBERATE 
INDIFFERENCE" TO 
AN INMATE'S 
HEALTH AND 
SAFETY IN PRISON 
CONDITION 
CLAIMS. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In Farmer v. Brennan, 
114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), the 
United States Supreme Court 
held that a prison official may be 
held accountable under the 
Eighth Amendment for know-
ing and disregarding a substan-
tial risk of harm faced by an 
inmate. In so ruling, the Court 
established the subjective ele-
ments of the "deliberate indif-
ference" test used to determine 
whether prison officials violate 
the Eighth Amendment for fail-
ure to prevent harm in prison 
condition claims. 
Petitioner Dee Farmer 
("Farmer") was a transsexual 
serving a prison sentence in an 
all-male federal prison for credit-
card fraud. Farmer, a biological 
male, had undergone treatment 
for silicone breast implants and 
unsuccessful black market sur-
gery to have his testicles re-
moved. Despitehisovertlyfemi-
nine characteristics, and his pre-
vious segregation at a different 
federal prison because of safety 
concerns, prison officials at the 
United States Penitentiary in 
Terre Haute, Indiana, ("USP-
Terre Haute") after an initial 
stay in administrative segrega-
tion, housed him in the general 
population of that maximum-
security prison. Farmer voiced 
no objection to either the-trans-
fer from the Federal Correc-
tional Institute in Oxford, Wis-
consin ("FCI-Oxford") or to 
his placement in the general 
population at USP-Terre Haute. 
Less than two weeks after his 
placement in the general popu-
lation, Farmer was beaten and 
raped by another inmate. He 
reported the incident and sev-
eral days later officials returned 
him to segregation. 
Farmer filed a Bivens 
complaint, alleging a violation 
of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. He contended that 
Respondents, in their official 
capacity as warden and Direc-
tor of the Bureau of prisons, 
either transferred him to USP-
Terre Haute or placed him in its 
general population despite 
knowledge that he was a trans-
sexual proj ecting feminine char-
acteristics, and was particularly 
vulnerable to sexual attack by 
some inmates. Farmer asserted 
that this amounted to a deliber-
ately indifferent failure to pro-
tecthis safety, and thus, a viola-
tion of his rights under the 
EighthAmendment. He sought 
compensatory and punitive dam-
ages and an injunction barring 
future confinement in any peni-
tentiary. 
Respondents filed a 
motion for summary judgment 
in the United States District 
Court for the Western District 
of Wisconsin. The district court 
held that there could be deliber-
ate indifference to Farmer's 
safety only if prison officials 
were reckless in a criminal sense, 
meaning that they had actual 
knowledge of a potential dan-
ger. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed without opinion. The 
Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to resolve the inconsistency 
among lower appellate court de-
CISIOns. 
The Court began its 
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analysis by taking a logical and 
analytical progression through 
case precedent that culminated 
in the Court's determination that 
prison rape was not constitu-
tionally tolerable. In short, 
prison officials could be held 
liable for failure to prevent harm 
under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. Farmer; 114 S. 
Ct. at 1976 (citations omitted). 
The Court made it clear 
that "[a] prison official's delib-
erate indifference to a substan-
tial risk of serious harm to an 
inmate violates the Eighth 
Amendment." Id. at 1974 (ci-
tations omitted). In acknowl-
edging that prison conditions 
may be "restrictive and even 
harsh," the Court emphasized 
that prison officials have the 
duty to protect inmates from 
harm at the hands of other pris-
oners. Id. at 1976-77 (quoting 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337,347 (1981)). 
The Court was careful 
to point out however, that not 
every injury suffered by an in-
mate reaches constitutional di-
mension and imposes liability 
on prison officials. 
Stating two necessary 
requirements for a constitutional 
violation ofthe Eighth Amend-
ment, the Court determined that 
firstthe deprivation alleged must 
be objectively "sufficiently se-
rious," subjecting the inmate to 
substantial risk of serious harm. 
Id. at 1977 (quoting Wilson v. 
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 
(1991)). Further, the Court 
noted that an exploration into 
the mindset of prison officials is 
necessary as well, thereby add-
ing a subjective component to 
cruel and unusual punishment 
inquiries. Id. (citing Wilson, 
501 U.S. at 302-03). 
In defining the term de-
liberate indifference, the Court 
observed that the phrase en-
compasses conduct more blame-
worthy than negligence. 
Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1978. 
Rejecting a high malicious stan-
dard, as well as a civil law defi-
nitionofrecklessness, the Court 
adopted a SUbjective reckless-
ness requirement as applied in 
the criminal law because it was 
a familiar and workable stan-
dard consistent with the Court's 
interpretation of the Cruel and 
UnusualPunishmentClause. Id 
at 1980. 
In rejecting Farmer's 
claim that prison officials would 
be free to ignore obvious dan-
gers to inmates, the Court in-
structed that under the subjec-
tive test adopted, a claimant 
need not show that a prison 
official acted or failed to act 
believing that harm would befall 
an inmate; it was enough that 
the official acted or failed to act 
despite his knowledge of a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm. Id. 
at 1981. Furthermore, the Court 
observed that a prison official 
could not escape liability by 
showing that while he was aware 
of an obvious substantial risk to 
an inmate's safety, he did not 
know that the inmate would be 
assaulted by a specific person. 
Id. at 1982. On the other hand, 
even if the official actually knew 
of a substantial risk and re-
sponded reasonably, he could 
not be held liable even if the risk 
was not averted. Id. at 1982-
83. 
The Court found 
unpersuasive Farmer's argu-
ment that the use of the subjec-
tive test would bar prospective 
relief and require inmates to 
unjustly suffer a physical injury 
before obtaining court ordered 
correction of objectively inhu-
mane prison conditions. Id. at 
1983. The Court referred to 
long settled case law which es-
tablished that "one does not 
have to await consummation of 
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threatened injury to obtain pre-
ventative relief." Id. at 1983 
(quoting Pennsylvania v. West 
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 
(1923)). 
The Court then focused 
on Farmer's request for injunc-
tive relief and enumerated the 
requirements that must be satis-
fied by an inmate seeking pro-
spective relief. First, both the 
objective and subjective require-
ments must be satisfied. 
Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1983. 
The Court instructed that the 
subjective factor should be de-
termined based on the current 
attitudes and conduct of prison 
officials at the time suit is brought 
and thereafter. Id at 1983-84. 
Second, the inmate must ad-
equately plead the issue. In 
order to survive summary j udg-
ment, evidence must be pro-
duced from which it can be in-
ferred that at the time suit was 
filed and at the time of summary 
judgment, the official knowingly 
and unreasonably disregarded 
an objectively intolerable risk of 
harm and would continue to do 
so. Id. 
Finally, the Court con-
sidered whether the district 
court's disposition of Farmer's 
complaint comported with 
Eighth Amendment principles. 
Id. at 1984-85. The Court found 
that in granting summary judg-
ment to Respondents, the dis-
trict court may have placed de-
cisive weight on Farmer's fail-
ure to notify Respondents of a 
risk of harm. Id. at 1985. The 
Court emphasized that failure 
to give notice was not dispositive 
of Farmer's claims for damages 
and injunctive relief. Id. Thus, 
the Supreme Court reversed the 
court of appeals' decision and 
ordered the district court on 
remand to reconsider its denial 
of Farmer's discovery motion 
and apply the principles ex-
plained in its decision. 
Faithful to its precedent, 
the United States Supreme 
Court in Farmer v. Brennan 
developed the subjective ele-
ments of deliberate indifference, 
without creating new obstacles 
for prisoners to overcome. The 
Court's decision is a practical, 
clear, and consistent standard 
forIowercourtstofollow. While 
the opinion is restrictive, to some 
extent, it makes clear that prison 
rape is constitutionally intoler-
able under the Eighth Amend-
ment. Prison officials may be 
held responsible for this inhu-
mane prison condition if the of-
ficial was aware ofthe risk and 
failed to take reasonable mea-
sures to abate it. Prisoners are 
now empowered with the means 
to successfully challenge the 
response of prison officials to 
the dehumanizing and volatile 
conditions of prison rape, long 
tolerated and long known to 
exist. 
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